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Abstract
A yearlong U.S. Army field study in Afghanistan examined the
demographics and threat perceptions of one of the most-at-risk
populations, that of Afghan truck drivers working for NATO’s
International Security Assistance Force Afghanistan (ISAF). The study
collected data from 766 Afghan truck drivers at the U.S.-operated
Kandahar Airfield in ISAF’s Regional Command South. The findings show
a wide diversity in age of the Afghan drivers as well as in terms of their
home province. The findings also show that although all Afghan truck
drivers had acute awareness and understanding of the high risks and
dangers of the job, they all noted that the attractive salary and scarcity
of jobs were dominant reasons for staying on the job. Findings also
reveal a strong resentment among the Afghan truck drivers about their
treatment by ISAF soldiers, as for the lack of protection for them and
their families after the 2014 departure of NATO forces. The findings can
provide significant insights and enhance the understanding of scholars,
counterinsurgency strategists, policymakers, and military planners about
“Host Country Nationals” as an important population of the human
terrain.
This article is available in Journal of Strategic Security:
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol8/iss4/7
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Introduction 
Over the last 20 years the United States and a number of its allies from NATO 
and beyond have conducted a series of large-scale military interventions in 
various parts of the world with lasting duration.  Many of these operations 
(e.g. Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan) have certainly caught the scholarly 
attention of a multitude of researchers, who examined them from several 
perspectives.  Those perspectives included military and political strategy,1 
medical,2 diplomacy, and international relations3 and much more.  Of course, 
there is also a large body of literature that has investigated humanitarian 
affairs4 relating to those conflicts.  There has also been a rapidly growing body 
of literature examining counterinsurgency5 in recent conflicts. 
                                                     
1 See John Cerone, “Minding the Gap: Outlining KFOR Accountability in Post-Conflict 
Kosovo,” European Journal of International Law 12:3 (2001): 469-488; Michael Pugh, 
“Civil-Military Relations in the Kosovo Crisis: An Emerging Hegemony,” Security 
Dialogue 31:2 (2000): 229-242; Steven E. Miler, “The Iraq Experiment and U.S. National 
Security,” Survival 48:4 (2006): 17-50; Alice Hills, “Something Old, Something New: 
Security Governance in Iraq: Analysis,” Conflict, Security and Development 5:2 (2005): 
183-202; Rathman Indurthy, “The Obama Administration’s Strategy in Afghanistan,”  
International Journal on World Peace 28:3 (2011): 7-52; Priyanka Singh, “American 
Strategy in Afghanistan: Dilemmas, Miscalculations and Outcomes,”  Strategic Analysis 
38:3 (2014): 369-375. 
2 See Samuel Loewenberg, “Afghanistan’s Hidden Health Issue,” The Lancet 9700(374) 
(2009): 1487-1488; Valerie Percival and Egbert Sondorp, “A Case Study of Health Sector 
Reform in Kosovo,” Conflict and Health 4:7 (2010): 7; Salaman Rawaf, “The Health Crisis 
in Iraq,” Critical Public Health 15:2 (2005): 181-188. 
3 See Carol M. Glen, “Multilateralism in a Unipolar World: The U.N. Security Council and 
Iraq,” International Relations of the Asia Pacific 6:2 (2006): 307-323; Irene Bernabeu, 
“Laying the Foundations of Democracy? Reconsidering Security Sector Reform Under 
U.N. Auspices in Kosovo,” Security Dialogue 38:1 (2007): 71-92; Alexander Mattelaer, 
“How Afghanistan has Strengthened NATO,” Survival 53:6 (2011): 127-140.  
4 See Urs von Arb, “Return and Reintegration: The Swiss Experience in Kosovo,” Refugee 
Survey Quarterly 20:2 (2014): 135-140; Andrew Harper, “Iraq’s Refugees: Ignored and 
Unwanted,” International Review of the Red Cross 90:869 (2008): 169-190; Alpslan 
Ozerdem and Abdul Hal Sofizada, “Sustainable Reintegration to Returning Refugees in 
Post-Taliban Afghanistan: Land-related Challenges,” Conflict, Security and Development 
6:1 (2006): 75-100. 
5 See Galula, David, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, (Santa Barbara, 
CA: Praeger Security International, 2006); David Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency. (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2010); Paul B. Rich, “Counterinsurgency or a War on 
Terror,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 21:2 (2010): 414-428; Lisa Hultman, “COIN and 
Civilian Collaterals: Patterns of Violence in Afghanistan, 2004-2009,” Small Wars & 
Insurgencies 23:2 (2012): 245-263; Eric Jardine, “Population-Centric Counterinsurgency 
and the Movement of Peoples,” Small Wars & Insurgencies, 23:2 (2012): 264-294; James 
A. Russell, “Counterinsurgency American Style: Considering David Petraeus and Twenty-
First Century Irregular War,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 25:1 (2014): 69-90; Ward 
Celeste Gventer, “Keep the Change: Counterinsurgency, Iraq, and Historical 
Understanding,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 25:1 (2014): 242-253; Paul Melshen, 
“Mapping Out a Counterinsurgency Campaign Plan,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 18:4 
(2007): 665-698; Brian Burton and John Nagl, “Learning as We Go: The US Army Adapts 
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Although these studies are extremely important in enhancing our 
understanding of conflict-related issues, one area that has received little 
attention from scholars is the role of “Host Country Nationals” working for 
those foreign military forces.  This study aims at shifting scholarly attention 
by examining Afghan nationals working as truck drivers for the International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and trying to understand who they are and 
their perceptions of threat and risk.  The reason for focusing on Afghanistan is 
because Host Country Nationals represent the largest percentage of 
contractors ever employed by the U.S. Department of Defense in any foreign 
conflict,6 and because truck drivers represent one of the highest at-risk 
groups7 within the population of Host Country Nationals contractors.  This 
knowledge should in turn allow for a more enhanced and nuanced 
understanding that can inform counterinsurgency strategists, policymakers, 
and scholars alike.  The study also aims at identifying potential indicators and 
theoretical frameworks that can be used in future research involving similar 
populations.  
 
There are several reasons why Host Country Nationals deserve focus by the 
scholarly community and counterinsurgency strategists: 1) in every large-
scale military intervention the U.S. and allied forces employed thousands of 
Host Country Nationals to support their day-to-day operations of military 
bases, 2) employing large numbers of Host Country Nationals has a direct 
impact on the local economy, 3) being employed by foreign military forces 
often makes them a default “high risk”8 segment of the population as they are 
often targeted by insurgents or opposition forces, 4) their employment has 
security implications for both the employees and the forces they work for, and 
5) they should also be seen as an element in the overall counterinsurgency 
strategy. 
 
This assessment in a way echoes the views of Gen. David. H. Petraeus, who 
first noted the critical nature of the human terrain in counterinsurgency 
                                                                                                                                                 
to Counterinsurgency in Iraq, July 2004-December 2006,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 
19:3 (2008): 303-327. 
6 Schwartz, Moshe, Training the Military to Manage Contractors During Expeditionary 
Operations, CRS Report R40057 (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, Congressional 
Research Service, 2008). 
7 Shelia J. McClaney and Douglas A. LeVien, “International Security Assistance Force 
Logistics Operations in Afghanistan,” Army Sustainment (2010), available at: 
http://www.alu.army.mil/alog/issues/JanFeb10/secassist_logop.html 
8 For the purposes of this study, the term “high risk” is used to denote the significantly 
higher risk of being killed or injured in targeted insurgent attacks. The term is used for 
the purpose of distinguishing that level or risk between Afghan truck drivers working for 
ISAF and all other Afghan contractors employed by ISAF.   
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 8, No. 4
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol8/iss4/7
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.8.4.1457
94 
 
operations in an essay he co-authored with Gen. John Galvin in 1986.  In an 
interview in 2013, Petraeus said: “Noting the importance of human terrain, I 
believe, is a fundamental aspect of crafting a counterinsurgency campaign.” 9  
Petraeus, who as commander at Fort Leavenworth supported the 
establishment of the Army’s Human Terrain System, noted the need for very 
nuanced understanding of the human terrain, “not just nationally, but sub-
nationally and literally all the way down to each valley and each village.”10  His 
views are also reflected by Melshen, who argued in 2007 that “a 
counterinsurgency strategist must be familiar with the unique parameters of 
the conflict—military, political, sociological, religious, cultural, ethnic, tribal, 
economic, and a multiplicity of others.”11 
 
Although Gen. Petraeus and Melshen did not specifically mention the Host 
Country Nationals as part of that human terrain, there is no doubt that they 
are very much at the heart of it.  A 2010 Congressional Research Service 
report examining the issue of contractors noted:  
 
“According to a [Department of Defense] official, contracting local 
nationals is an important element in counterinsurgency strategy. 
Employing local nationals injects money into the local economy, 
provides job training, and can give the U.S. a more sophisticated 
understanding of the local landscape.”12  
 
Although this statement by the defense official underscores the importance of 
Host Country Nationals, in order for someone to incorporate them in any 
counterinsurgency strategy and plan, s/he would first need to know more 
about them.  Also, their recognized importance has made them extremely 
vulnerable.  According to the U.S. Department of Labor, between September 
2001 and March 2007 as many as 990 contractors had been killed in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, while 13,000 others were injured.13  This translates to an average 
of “one civilian contractor of every four members of the U.S. Armed Forces.”14  
                                                     
9 Octavia Manea, “Reflections on the ‘Counterinsurgency Decade: Small Wars Journal 
Interview with General David. H. Petraeus,” Small Wars Journal, September 1, 2013, 
available at: http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/reflections-on-the-
counterinsurgency-decade-small-wars-journal-interview-with-general-david. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Melshen, “Mapping out a Counterinsurgency Campaign,” p.667. 
12 Moshe Schwartz, “Department of Defense Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: 
Background and Analysis,” Congressional Research Service (2010), p.9. 
13 Bernard Debusmann, “In Outsourced U.S. Wars, Contractors Deaths Top 1,000,” 
Reuters, July 3, 2007, available at: 
http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USN0318650320070703 
14 Ibid. 
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Although the specific data does not offer a breakdown in terms of those 
contractors’ countries of origin of, it offers an overall picture about the risks 
faced by contractors in general in the two conflict zones. 
 
Still, Host Country Nationals remain neglected by the scholarly community 
and counterinsurgency strategists, and thus very little is known and 
understood about them.  That is particularly true for those who would be 
classified as being high risk.  There are several reasons that may have 
contributed to this trend, including the difficulty of identifying the relevant 
sample and gaining systematic and prolonged access to it. 
 
Contractors in Afghanistan 
The U.S. military’s dependency on contractors in the conducting of 
“Operation Enduring Freedom” in Afghanistan is substantial. Data from the 
Central Command and analyzed by the Congressional Research Service15 (See 
Figure 1), show that as of March 2010 there were significantly more 
contractors than U.S. forces on the ground.  Specifically, contractors 
represented 59 percent of the workforce in Afghanistan—a 10 percent 
decrease from 2008.16  The 2008 level appears to have been the highest 
number of contractors employed by the Department of Defense in any conflict 
in the history of the United States.17 
 
Although there were multiple factors that pushed those numbers higher (e.g. 
the additional 30,000 U.S. troops that arrived in the country to boost 
offensive operations–part of the “Surge” strategy–and the logistical support 
they needed), the figures are still unprecedented. 
 
FIGURE 1. Comparison of Contractor Personnel to Troops Levels 
in Afghanistan  
(March 2010) 
 Contractors Troops Ratio 
Afghanistan 
Only 
112,092 79,100 1.42:1 
CENTCOM 
AOR* 
250,335 272,260 .92:1 
Source: CENTCOM 2nd Quarter Contractor Census Report.18 
                                                     
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
17 CRS Report R40057, “Training the Military.” 
18 Ibid. 
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Just like in Iraq, the DoD contractors supporting operations in Afghanistan 
(See Figure 2) represented a mix of U.S. nationals and third-country and local 
nationals.  In Afghanistan’s case, though, there are some very distinct 
differences. One striking comparison is that in Iraq the “Third Country 
Nationals” accounted for 56 percent of all contractors in the country, 
compared to just 16 percent in Afghanistan.19  But perhaps the most 
interesting comparison of all is that of “Local Nationals”—or Host Country 
Nationals—who in Iraq accounted for just 18 percent but in Afghanistan 
represented an impressive 70 percent of all DoD contractors in the country.20  
This massive reliance on Host Country Nationals contractors by the U.S. 
Department of Defense makes Afghanistan an important case study, an 
importance that is highlighted even further by the daily risks that those 
contractors had to overcome because of their affiliation with U.S. forces. 
 
FIGURE 2. Profile of DoD Contractor Personnel in Afghanistan  
(March 2010) 
 Total 
Contractors 
U.S. 
Citizens 
Third-
country 
Nationals 
Host 
Country 
Nationals 
Number 112,092 16,081 17,512 78,499 
Percent of 
Total 
100% 14% 16% 70% 
Source: CENTCOM 2nd Quarter Contractor Census Report.21 
                                                     
19 Ibid.  
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
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Source: NATO.22  
 
Trucking in Afghanistan 
U.S. government contracting in Afghanistan has been the largest of the three 
conflicts reviewed, with the U.S. government having spent more than $50 
billion for contracts between 2005 and 2011 alone.23  Trucking is certainly one 
of the key logistical functions on which the U.S. government has relied to 
assist with the supplying of U.S. forces deployed to the landlocked and war-
torn country of Afghanistan.  In 2011, the U.S. military signed a $1 billion 
contract with 20 Afghan trucking companies.24  With each Afghan trucking 
company employing hundreds of drivers to meet the sustainment needs of 
tens of thousands of U.S. troops, this is one of the highest at-risk groups of the 
                                                     
22 Note: The map illustrates the areas of responsibility of the various ISAF regional 
commands, including that of Regional Command South (RC-S) in Kandahar province 
where the study was conducted. 
23 Moshe Schwartz, “Wartime Contracting in Afghanistan: Analysis and Issues for 
Congress,” Congressional Research Service (November 14, 2011): pp.1-20. 
24 David Lerman, “U.S. Army $1 Billion Afghan Trucking Plan Aims to End ‘Racket,’” 
Bloomberg, September 15, 2011, available at: 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-09-15/u-s-army-1-billion-afghan-
trucking-plan-aims-to-end-racket-. 
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Afghan population.  In 2008, one Afghan trucking company contracted by 
ISAF recorded as many as 202 insurgent attacks against its convoys (a 44% 
increase from 2007), that resulted in the killing of as many as 100 of its 
drivers and the destruction of over 200,000 liters of fuel.25  That same year, 
insurgent attacks on Highway 1 that links the national capital of Kabul with 
Kandahar reached historic heights, prompting the ISAF commander to make 
freedom of movement his top priority.26 
 
In spite of improved security measures by ISAF and contractors, such 
insurgent attacks continued to occur every year.  On August 28, 2013 in a 
single insurgent attack in the western Farah province six contractor truck 
drivers were killed and 35 ISAF supply fuel trucks were destroyed.27  Overall, 
in 2013 the Taliban carried out a total of about 24,000 attacks throughout the 
country against various targets, while in 2014 that number was around 
18,000.28 
 
This sustained and acute threat from the Taliban shows that the risks to 
Afghan truck drivers working for ISAF never went away.  All data indicates 
that the specific factor of risk was rather constant across time, a consistency 
that made it a very reliable criterion with which to study this group of Host 
Country Nationals.  
 
Hypotheses 
The study investigated a total of five hypotheses.  The hypotheses are rooted 
in the existing understanding about the Afghan demographics and the overall 
appreciation of the relationship between the Afghan population and ISAF 
forces.  All five hypotheses were addressed via semi-structured field 
interviews that were conducted in the form of quasi focus groups.  The data 
generated by the hypotheses aims at investigating several assumptions and 
identifying potential indicators and theoretical frameworks that can be used 
in future research involving similar populations.  
 
                                                     
25 McClaney and LeVien, “International Security Assistance.” 
26 Ibid. 
27 Zahin, “35 ISAF Supply Trucks Torched, 6 Drivers Killed,” Pajhwok Network, August 
28, 2013, available at: http://www.pajhwok.com/en/2013/08/28/35-isaf-supply-
trucks-torched-6-drivers-killed. 
28 The Associated Press, “Afghan Troop Deaths up; Called ‘Unsustainable,” November 5, 
2014, available at: 
http://m.apnews.com/ap/db_268780/contentdetail.htm?contentguid=eP4IrYVn. 
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H1.  A lower life expectancy for males in the country will be positively 
correlated with a younger demographic for the Afghan truck drivers working 
for ISAF in Kandahar. 
 
The variable of life expectancy was chosen specifically to test a set of 
assumptions about the demographic makeup of Afghan truck drivers working 
for ISAF in Regional Command-South (RC-S).  This was one of three variables 
that aimed at testing and exploring demographic assumptions.   
 
H2. Afghan truck drivers whose home is near the ISAF’s base in Kandahar 
will be more likely to be employed by the coalition forces at the specific base 
than those whose home is further away. 
 
The hypothesis explores the variable “home” to test a set of assumptions 
about the demographic makeup of Afghan truck drivers working for ISAF in 
RC-S. For the purposes of the study, “home” is designated at the provincial 
and district levels.  This was one of three variables that aimed at testing and 
exploring demographic assumptions.   
 
H3. The country’s ethnic and tribal composition will be reflected in the ethnic 
and tribal composition of the Afghan truck drivers working for ISAF in 
Kandahar. 
 
The hypothesis explores the ethnic and tribal background to test a set of 
assumptions about the demographic makeup of Afghan truck drivers working 
for ISAF in RC-S.  This was one of three variables that aimed at testing and 
exploring demographic assumptions.   
 
H4. Afghans who have a high threat and risk perception of truck driving in 
the country are less likely to be working as truck drivers by ISAF in Kandahar 
than those who have a lower threat and risk perception. 
 
The hypothesis explores the relationship between an individual’s risk/threat 
perception about an activity and the likelihood of engaging in that activity.  
Exploring this relationship will result in an enhanced understanding of the 
Afghan truck drivers working for ISAF in RC-S. 
 
H5. Afghans who have a positive view of ISAF are more likely to choose to 
work as truck drivers for ISAF in Kandahar than those who don’t. 
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The hypothesis explores the relationship between an individual’s perception 
of an institution and the likelihood of deciding to work for that institution.  
Exploring this relationship will result to an enhanced understanding about 
the Afghan truck drivers working for ISAF in RC-S. 
 
Methodology 
The study employed the qualitative method of semi-structured field 
interviews.  The method was deemed appropriate as the subject has not been 
investigated previously and as with all exploratory studies, the use of 
qualitative methods can identify indicators and variables that can be tested in 
future studies. 
 
The interviews were conducted by social scientists employed by the U.S. 
Army’s Human Terrain System.  The project underwent an ethics review and 
approval process, which included an assessment of the sample type and 
questionnaire, prior to the initiation of the project.  The question set was 
derived from the particular requirements set by the Command General of 
Regional Command South, who sanctioned the specific study.  A list of ten 
open-ended questions was constructed and the interviews were conducted in 
a fluid “focus group” type of environment.  The U.S. Army cleared the data 
generated from the project for public release. 
 
Sampling 
The study employed a non-probability purposive sampling strategy.   As the 
study was conducted to address questions of field commanders on the 
ground, the population of interest was Afghan truck drivers working for ISAF, 
and specifically those who deliver cargo to the U.S.-operated Kandahar 
Airfield military base.  As such, the scope and type of sample pose certain 
restrictions and limitations on any inference to the larger population of 
Afghan truck drivers who are employed by ISAF in other regions around the 
country.  Despite those limitations, the final sample size was large enough 
(n=766) to allow for a better understanding about the Afghan truck drivers 
working for ISAF in Regional Command South.29 
 
Due to the hazardous and unpredictable nature of the security conditions on 
the ground, not all participants were able to answer the entire questionnaire, 
thus generating variations in the samples for each research question.  The 
                                                     
29 The Regional Command South was one of four regional commands operated by ISAF 
and it covered a total of six provinces: Day Kundi, Helmand, Kandahar, Nimruz, Uruzgan, 
and Zabul. The headquarters of the regional command was in Kandahar. 
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study did not use any form of incentive for participation.  Moreover, 
participation in the interviews was on a volunteer basis and in no way had an 
effect on the employment of the Afghan truck drivers. 
 
The truck drivers came from all over Regional Command South and at times 
other parts of Afghanistan.  Even though predominantly Pashtun, there were 
also Hazaras and Tajiks.  Drivers were exclusively male, so this was always a 
limitation.  Ages were anywhere from 18 to 59, although Afghans seldom 
know their exact age.  Even though they have a tazkera (identity document) 
which lists date of birth, this is often based on a guess by those issuing the 
tazkera.  If a driver attended school, he was issued a tazkera at that time but 
even then the age was arbitrarily assigned to an approximate year. 
 
Data Collection 
Data collection started on May 6, 2013 and ended on April 30, 2014.  All 
drivers were interviewed at the Entry Control Points just outside of Kandahar 
Airfield base.  Each engagement (a separate day for each Entry Control Point 
each week) was done weekly for 3 to 4 hours per Entry Control Point.  
Engagements took place at two of the Entry Control Points at Kandahar 
Airfield, namely Entry Control Point 4 and Entry Control Point 5.  The driver 
holding area of Entry Control Point 4 was just outside the far eastern gate of 
the airfield, while the Entry Control Point 5 holding area was outside the 
south gate. 
 
Drivers had to first have their trucks searched and weighed at a yard about 
1km outside of Kandahar Air Field’s perimeter then pass inspection at the 
Afghan National Army gate to the airbase.  Once through that gate the drivers 
had to park their trucks outside the entry control points and go through a 
security check.  The ISAF soldiers manning Entry Control Point 4 were 
Bulgarian and those manning the Entry Control Point 5 were Slovakian.  
Drivers entered each holding area through a long corridor where they were 
physically searched.  They then entered the biometric trailer where they had 
their retina’s scanned to see if they were on the blacklist.  
 
Once cleared by security, the drivers entered the resting area which had shops 
where they could buy food.  At any given time the entry control point’s 
holding area had 75 to 150 drivers.  During the engagements the interviewer 
and linguist would enter the inner enclosure by the drivers.  Eventually the 
drivers, through word of mouth, knew who they were.  The interviewer would 
sit on the ground with a group of men and explain the purpose of his visit, 
gaining their verbal consent for the interview.   Soon the numbers would swell 
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as the Afghan drivers were keen to make their opinions known and to 
participate in what they viewed as a “Shura”—a type of a decision-making 
council that is found in Islamic tradition. 
 
The typical group size during an interview was 10 to 15 Afghan truck drivers, 
but often would attract a crowd of up to 50 drivers.  Typically, the 
engagement would open by drivers airing their grievances about the 
conditions at the entry control points, but they would willingly engage with 
the questions asked by the researcher.  Usually one or two of the drivers 
would attempt to dominate the initial discussions, but the researcher would 
direct questions to the others who then would voice their own opinions.  The 
linguist/interpreter also played an integral role in the process as he would 
field questions from the drivers and provide cues to what was happening in 
sidebar discussions as well. 
 
Each engagement lasted anywhere from 1 to 3 hours.  Sometimes they were 
shorter because of extremes in temperatures.  Typically the interviewer 
offered chai to the drivers; at times the drivers reciprocated and bought chai 
from the storekeepers to provide for the interviewer.  Once the engagement 
was over, the interviewer and linguist spent an hour or two reviewing notes 
on what had taken place.  Any corrections or additions were carefully and 
fully discussed and, once both were satisfied, the notes were typed up 
verbatim.  Later that same day, the interviewer met once again with the 
linguist to review the typed notes and, once fully satisfied, the reports were 
drafted from those notes.  Since the linguist had a security clearance, he also 
read the report draft to ensure that everything was represented accurately.  
 
Findings 
H1 stated that there is a positive correlation between a country’s lower life 
expectancy and younger age of the truck drivers working for ISAF in 
Kandahar.  The sample size for this particular hypothesis was n=512.  The 
findings (See Table 1) show that the ages of the truck drivers ranged from 18 
to 59 years of age, with the vast majority of them (60%) between the ages of 
20 to 29.  As such, the findings appear to support the hypothesis, although the 
notable presence of older drivers–about 15 percent–40 years of age and older. 
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TABLE 1. Age of Afghan Truck Drivers in Regional Command-
South 
 
 
 
H2 stated that Afghan truck drivers whose home is near the ISAF’s base in 
Kandahar will be more likely to be employed by the coalition forces at the 
specific base than those whose home is further away.  The hypothesis was 
answered with two samples.  The first sample focused on province of origin 
and had n=766.  The findings (See Table 2) show that the majority of the 
drivers (58%) were from the province of Kandahar.  The findings also show 
that the drivers call home 30 of the country’s 34 provinces.  As such, the 
findings appear to support the hypothesis, but at the same time the large 
percentage (42%) of truck drivers who called faraway provinces home raise 
serious questions about the relationship between proximity to workplace in 
the specific context. 
 
TABLE 2. Province of Origin 
 
Province Number of 
Truck 
Drivers 
Percentage 
Kandahar 446 58% 
Heart 58 8% 
Zabul 41 5% 
Helmand 31 4% 
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Ghazni 25 3% 
Paktia 28 3% 
Kabul 21 3% 
Wardak 19 2.5% 
Farah 14 2% 
Logar 10 1% 
Paktika 8 1% 
Uruzgan 8 1% 
Kunduz 6 1% 
Nangarhar 6 1% 
Badakhshan 5 1% 
Panjsher 5 1% 
Parwan 5 .6% 
Baghlan 4 .6% 
Mazar-e-
Sharif 
4 .5% 
Gardez 3 .4% 
Jawzjan 3 .4% 
Laghman 3 .4% 
Pakistan* 3 .4% 
Takhar 2 .3% 
Balkh 1 .1% 
Bamiyan 1 .1% 
Ghor 1 .1% 
Jalalabad 2 .3% 
Kapisa 1 .1% 
Peshawar 1 .1% 
Samangan 1 .1% 
Total 766 100% 
* Three drivers identified themselves as being from Pakistan.   
 
The second sample focused on the district of origin and had n-152.  The 
findings (See Table 3) show that 53 drivers (or 35 %) came from Kandahar 
and Kandahar City, while another 11 drivers (or 7%) came from the district of 
Dand of Kandahar province.  Overall, the majority of the drivers surveyed in 
this question came from districts located in Kandahar province.  
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TABLE 3. District of Origin 
 
District Number of Afghan 
Truck Drivers 
Percentage 
Kandahar 35 23% 
Kandahar City 18 12% 
Dand 11 7% 
Arghandab 6 4% 
Spin Boldak 6 4% 
Arghistan 5 3% 
Daman 4 3% 
Panjwa’i 4 3% 
Zharay 4 3% 
Hamid Aba 3 2% 
Qalat 3 2% 
Shah Wali Kot 3 2% 
Shindand 3 2% 
Kheng 2 1% 
Mirwaz 2 1% 
Shah Joy 2 1% 
Wordak 2 1% 
Other 39 26% 
Total 152 100% 
 
 
H3 stated that the country’s ethnic and tribal composition will be reflected in 
the ethnic and tribal composition of the Afghan truck drivers working for 
ISAF in Kandahar.  The hypothesis was address with two different samples.  
The first sample focused on the ethnic group origin and had n=546.  The 
findings (See Table 4) show that the vast majority of the drivers (86%) were 
Pashtuns, while the second largest group was the Tajiks who accounted for 8 
percent. 
 
TABLE 4. Ethnic Groups 
 
Ethnic Group Number of Afghan truck 
Drivers 
Percentage 
Pasthun 468 86% 
Tajik 46 8% 
Baloch 9 2% 
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Hazara 5 1% 
Mangal 6 1% 
Uzbek 5 1% 
Sayed 3 <.05% 
Punjabi – 
Pakistan 
2 <.05% 
Arab 2 <.05% 
Total 546 100% 
 
The second sample for this hypothesis focused on the Pashtun tribes and had 
n=468. The findings (See Table 5) show that 82 (or 17%) of the surveyed 
drivers came from the Pashtun tribe of Popalzai, while 59 (or 13%) came from 
Achakzai tribe. 
 
TABLE 5. Pashtun Tribes 
 
Pashtun 
Tribes 
Number of Afghan 
Truck Drivers 
Percentage 
Popalzai 82 17% 
Achakzai 59 13% 
Noorzai 42 9% 
Barakzai 39 8% 
Kakar 30 6% 
Alikozai 29 6% 
Suleiman 
Khil 
24 5% 
Alizai 20 5% 
Ahmadzai 20 5% 
Taraki 12 3% 
Hotak 10 2% 
Tokhi 11 2% 
Other* 90 19% 
Total 468 100% 
*Representing some of the remaining 39 Pashtun tribal groups. 
 
H4 stated that Afghans who have a high threat and risk perception of truck 
driving in the country are less likely to be employed as truck drivers by ISAF 
in Kandahar than those who have a lower threat and risk perception.  The 
particular hypothesis was answered with qualitative data and the sample size 
was n=766.  
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The findings do not support the hypothesis.  Specifically, the findings show 
that the Taliban and the Afghan National Security Forces threaten the Afghan 
truck drivers daily.  The findings also reveal that while all drivers had acute 
awareness and clear understanding of the high risks and dangers of the job, 
the monetary compensation was singled out as the dominant reason for 
staying on the job.  In terms of their perspective about their future after the 
NATO forces withdraw at the end of 2014, the findings show that the drivers 
were resigned to the fact that after the “Americans leave” they will be without 
employment and protection–particularly the kind of protection that locally-
hired linguists/interpreters would get. 
 
Specifically, truck drivers face clear and constant danger during the course of 
their work in Afghanistan, particularly on the “ring road”–a road network that 
connects 16 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces, and which includes Highway 1 that 
connects Kandahar and Kabul.  Drivers face threat from Improvised Explosive 
Devices, ambushes by insurgents as well as criminals, and hijacking.  Truck 
drivers would often show the researcher scars from bullet wounds or other 
injuries related to their work.  The dangers of working in a warzone are 
exacerbated for the truck drivers because they are targeted, not only by the 
insurgents, but also by corrupt Afghan National Police, Afghan Local Police, 
Traffic Police and the Afghan Civil Order Police.  The Afghan Civil Order 
Police, in particular, not only exploited the men they were to accompany in 
convoy by soliciting bribes, but also abandoned the convoys when they were 
under attack.  The other branches of police often directly targeted the drivers 
for bribes and failure to pay either meant direct assaults or failure to protect 
the drivers. 
 
The truck drivers also spoke of the other risks involved by associating with 
ISAF, particularly “the Americans.”  Not only were they at risk from the 
Taliban but also they were victimized and made to pay large bribes by Afghan 
National Police at checkpoints and even ostracized in their own towns and 
villages because of their association with Coalition Forces.  Even in their own 
villages drivers felt that they were treated contemptuously because of their 
work for what they termed as “the Americans.”  Drivers who had to make 
their way through Kandahar City complained that the Traffic Police, whose 
commander was apparently at the forefront of this, would target specifically 
drivers who carried goods for the coalition and extort large sums of money 
from them. 
 
Another danger reported by the truck drivers was from within their own 
ranks.  On numerous occasions the truck drivers articulated their fear that 
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 8, No. 4
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol8/iss4/7
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.8.4.1457
108 
 
some of the other drivers were colluding with the Taliban.  On two occasions 
drivers informed the researcher that specific individuals were working for the 
Taliban and providing critical route and timing information to the insurgents.  
Drivers expressed ongoing concern that their families would be in danger if 
the Taliban found out that they were working for the Coalition Forces, but 
that work was scarce and it was a risk that they had to take.  Taliban 
sympathizers or infiltrators in their ranks became a great concern because of 
this. 
 
In terms of the overall threat assessment related to their job, the truck drivers 
pointed out that the income was the most attractive feature and noted the 
scarcity of jobs in the region.  For a number of the men it was the first and 
only job they had ever had.  Also, they noted that this was the highest paid job 
they could attain as they lacked any formal education.  Overall, they appeared 
to deem the risk to be worth the reward.  Still, the drivers were resigned to the 
fact that after the "Americans leave" they would be without employment and 
protection. Unlike the local linguists who were expecting to receive visas to 
one of the ISAF countries due to the danger they would face if they were left 
behind, the drivers had no such expectation.  Their attitude about those 
prospects varied between bravado in the form of "If they attack us we will 
fight because we are Pashtun men," to utter resignation. 
 
H5 stated that Afghans who have a positive view of ISAF are more likely to 
choose to work as truck drivers for ISAF in Kandahar than those who don’t.  
The particular hypothesis was answered with qualitative data and the sample 
size was n=766. 
 
The findings do not support the hypothesis.  Specifically, the findings show 
that the Afghan truck drivers feel humiliated by nature of the security 
searches carried out at checkpoints by ISAF and the poor conditions of the 
resting areas at those checkpoints.  A recurrent theme among the truck 
drivers was that they were treated poorly from all sides.  They felt that they 
were not treated with respect by the Coalition Forces because of conditions at 
the entry control points of the airbase and because of the nature of the 
personal and vehicle searches.  Specifically, if any of the drivers failed a retina 
scan at an ECP then they would be held in a holding cell no larger than 8’ by 
8’ that was also known as a “cage.”  This was in itself a great affront, 
particularly at Entry Control Point 5 where the “cage” was in full view of all of 
the other drivers.  Although there were shops at the entry control points 
where they could buy food, many drivers were often forced to stay in the 
holding area for three or four days—in extreme cases for several weeks—and 
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as such the cost of buying food became prohibitive.  Accommodation at the 
entry control points was also an issue.  Initially the mattresses at Entry 
Control Point 5 were on the ground and in very poor condition—basically just 
springs with cloth on them.  After the issue was brought to the attention of the 
command, new beds and mattresses were brought to Entry Control Point 5.  
The beds at Entry Control Point 4 were always adequate. 
 
Another issue at the entry control points was the treatment by the ISAF 
soldiers.  They often verbally abused and shouted at the Afghan men, which 
was very insulting according to the drivers interviewed.  The men felt that 
they were not given respect and that they were “treated like animals.”  Lack of 
understanding by the Coalition Forces of the Afghan ways and culture was a 
major issue for the truck drivers, especially when it came to the manner of the 
physical search (Afghan men did not mind lifting their shirts in front but 
lifting it in the back they claimed was a homosexual act–both were required 
during the search.) 
   
Conclusion 
The study aimed at examining one of the largely overlooked groups in recent 
conflict zones, that of Host Country Nationals working as contractors for 
foreign forces in their country.  The study focused on Afghan truck drivers 
working for NATO’s ISAF mission in an effort to understand more about their 
background, motivation and threat perceptions.  The Afghan truck drivers 
represent a unique subset group of the Host Country Nationals population, 
being one of the highest at-risk groups of local contractors employed by 
ISAF.30  The systematic field data collection over a 12-month period generated 
several significant insights about them, allowing for a better understanding 
and for the expansion of literature about the specific segment of the 
population.   
 
Specifically, findings showed that their age ranged between 18 and 59, making 
them highly diverse in that regard.  Although the vast majority (some 60%) 
was between the ages of 20 and 29, the data also showed that there was a 
significant representation of the aging population, with 30% of the sample 
being between 35 and 59.  Considering that life expectancy in Afghanistan for 
2013 was 61 years of age,31 it can be argued that although this seems to be job 
                                                     
30 See McClaney and LeVien, “International Security Assistance”; Debusmann, “In 
Outsourced U.S. Wars”; Zahin, “35 ISAF Supply Trucks.” 
31 World Bank, “Country Data – Afghanistan,” (2014), available at: 
http://data.worldbank.org/country/afghanistan 
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that is attracting mostly younger men, age did not appear to pose much of a 
deterrence for recruitment.  
  
Findings also showed that the overwhelming majority of drivers (86%) were 
Pashtuns, while the second largest ethnic group was Tajiks (8%).  These 
figures are not that surprising as Kandahar is one of the areas where Pashtuns 
are the dominant ethnic group, while Pashtuns and Tajiks also represent the 
two largest ethnic groups in the country.  These figures become more 
interesting, however, when connected with the findings about the province of 
origin of the drivers, which showed that they come from 30 of the country’s 
34 provinces.  Although 58% of them were from Kandahar Province, the 
remaining 42% came from 29 provinces.  This is a significant finding as it 
shows that although the truck drivers were significantly homogeneous in 
terms of their ethnicity, their place of origin made them considerably more 
diverse.  That diversity was also present when it came to the Pashtun tribes to 
which the drivers belong, with findings showing that more than a dozen of 
them were represented by the group.    
 
Beyond the demographical insights, the study also produced useful significant 
findings in terms of the motivations and threat perceptions of the Afghan 
truck drivers.  Specifically, the study found that lack of formal education, 
scarcity of jobs, and an otherwise unattainable salary offered by trucking 
companies, were the main motivators for the Afghan men to get and keep 
these jobs.  These factors seem to trump any security and safety concerns that 
came with the job, as findings show that the drivers have acute awareness and 
clear understanding of the dangers and risks associated with their job.  The 
same factors also seem to negate—or at least keep at bay—all the frustrations 
and resentment they may have against NATO forces as a result of what they 
describe as “culturally insensitive” personal security searches. 
 
Finally, the study found that in addition to the resentment over their 
treatment by ISAF soldiers there is also bitterness over the lack of provision 
from NATO to provide them with any protection after troops depart at the 
end of 2014—the kind of protection (e.g. visas) that would be offered to locally 
hired translators/interpreters.  Similar resentment was also voiced over the 
lack of plan for jobs creation after NATO leaves the country.  These insights 
provide a nuanced understanding that can assist policymakers and military 
strategists who in the future will be involved in drafting and formulating 
plans for similar contingency operations. 
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The findings provide a significant first step in the development of greater 
understanding of in four major areas: a) establishing a background on one of 
the highest at-risk groups among Host Country Nationals, b) establishing a 
baseline understanding of their motivations and threat/risk perceptions of 
such a group, c) identifying theoretical frameworks that can provide platforms 
for further research into this area, and d) informing formulation of future 
policy in relation to Host Country Nationals and in particular the highest at-
risk groups in a counterinsurgency environment. 
 
The findings certainly allow for insights into the first two areas, but most 
importantly one can now identify potential indicators—and thus possible 
theoretical frameworks—that can be of great use in the development of this 
research area.  Specifically, one indicator that is worth examining is “Risk 
Perception.”  Although the current study did not employ a specific theoretical 
framework as it was designed as an exploratory study and aimed at informing 
specific key information requirements from the commanders on the ground, 
the data generated from it suggest that Prospect Theory could be a helpful 
framework.  Although the data from the current study do not provide support 
for the specific theory as it goes against its certainty effect factor, this could 
very well be an outlier case and as such we deem that is certainly worth 
exploring further.  
 
Another indicator that was identified and shows very promising signs in 
terms of prediction is “Motivation.”  One theoretical framework that we 
believe can be used to explore this indicator further is Protection Motivation 
Theory.  As with the previous theoretical framework, the findings of the study 
do not provide much support for it either.  On the contrary, the findings show 
that although the perceived severity of the threat and the perceived 
probability of the occurrence were verified at very high levels, the decision of 
the Afghan truck drivers did result in them seeking to protect themselves. 
This could very well be the result of an outlier case, or it could be linked to the 
efficacy factor in relation to a recommended preventive behavior.         
 
 The last area of contribution is that in the formulation of future policy in 
respect with formulation of future policy in relation to Host Country 
Nationals and in particular the highest at-risk groups.  Both policymakers and 
military strategists who will be involved in drafting and formulating plans for 
future counterinsurgency operations can benefit from the findings of this 
study.  Melshen, in his 2007 counterinsurgency study, argued that “the search 
for a perfect counterinsurgency model or template that can be imposed as a 
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universal model in counterinsurgency effort is a futile effort.”32  He stressed 
that “strategists of insurgency warfare are well aware of the fact that what 
worked in one insurgency might not work in another.”33  As such, he noted 
that “many questions should be raised by counterinsurgency leadership when 
initiating a counterinsurgency campaign,”34 including what considerations 
were taken by commanders in previous counterinsurgency campaigns. 
 
This study certainly is the direct product of such questioning. In order for 
studies like this one to inform a grand counterinsurgency strategy, however, 
they need to be replicated across the commands. Such studies need to be 
carried out at the very early stages of a campaign and be repeated at various 
iterations to detect changes over time, as well as any impact from the 
resulting changes in the strategy. The need for this kind of scholarly and 
methodologically rigorous work that aims to inform strategists and 
commanders on the ground is reflected in the evolved U.S. counterinsurgency 
doctrine.35  Moreover, according to Melshen, “insurgency and 
counterinsurgency will remain the hallmark of the twenty-first century.”36  If 
that is proven to be the case, hopefully Host Country Nationals will not be an 
afterthought in the formulation of the next counterinsurgency strategy.  
Although this study was conducted in direct response to a regional 
commander’s information requirements, this did not occur until almost the 
end of Operation Enduring Freedom.  This is a decade too late and as such 
negated any meaningful response to the information gathered.  Information 
of this nature needs to be collected early, across time and place (throughout 
the theater of operation) if it is to be considered for any meaningful 
population-centric counterinsurgency plans.      
 
As with any study, especially for those conducted in a conflict zone, there are 
certain limitations to the findings.  The interviews were conducted by U.S. 
Army civilians, and although not part of the uniformed military, any 
association with the NATO forces may have been an influencer.  All interviews 
were conducted at entry control points on a NATO military base in order to 
ensure the safety of all the parties involved, as well as to serve as a natural 
setting where truck drivers gather as part of their job routine.  Still, the fact 
that they had just undergone what they describe as culturally insensitive 
personal security searches may have also been an influencer.  The hazardous 
                                                     
32 Melshen, “Mapping out a Counterinsurgency,” p.668. 
33 Ibid, p.667. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Martin G. Clemis, “Crafting Non-Kinetic Warfare: The Academic-Military Nexus in US 
Counterinsurgency Doctrine,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 20:1 (2009): 160-184. 
36 Melshen, “Mapping out a Counterinsurgency,” p. 666.  
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and unpredictable security environment on the ground also resulted to 
variations in sampling for some of the questions, thus limiting any stronger 
correlations.  The only way to confirm the age of drivers is from their tazkera 
(identity document), which lists the date of birth.  Still, although an official 
government-issued document, that date of birth is often based on a guess by 
those issuing the document.  As such, the age data are only as accurate as the 
tazkera of each driver. 
 
Regardless of those limitations, the study offers rare insights into the 
demographics, motivations and threat perceptions of Afghan truck drivers—
one of the highest at-risk groups of Host Country Nationals working for 
foreign military forces in their country.  The findings can provide a source for 
further research into this largely overlooked group of Host Country Nationals 
in conflict zones, and as such enhance our understanding about them. 
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